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This article analyses the defence industry in the second tier arms producer states by 
using Japan and Sweden as case studies. Arms production in the second tier is often 
inefficient and poorly run, though some of them managed to remain profitable. Why some 
second tier defence industries are able to remain profitable and successful despite those 
challenges? This research argues that the inclusion of non-arms and dual-use technology 
sales is crucial to maintain a profitable industry, especially when foreign arms sales face 
heavy confinement. Furthermore, giving up autarky and establishing an independent 
political relations with first tier arms manufacturers are imperative to maintain profitable 
defence industries. Second tier defence manufacturers are often caught in the ambition to 
achieve autarky and focus to sell cutting edge arms which definitely require a lot of funds. 
Moreover, an independent political relation with top tier defence industries countries can 
guarantee freedom in developing the industry as well as executing foreign arms sales. This 
paper starts by discussing the analytical framework of the method to maintain defence 
industry in the second tier states. The argument of this paper is then assessed against the 
case of the defense industries in Japan and Sweden. The paper then concludes with the 
implication of the findings for policy making in second tier defence industry world.
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1. Introduction
Peter Dombrowski and Eugene Gholz argued military transformation efforts pretty 
much rely on the performance of the defence industrial base. Furthermore, working on 
R&D to develop specific weapon systems or equipment is a crucial contribution that the 
defence industry can make to foster military transformation (Dombrowski & Gholz, 2006, 
pp. 16, 20). The argument from Dombrowksi and Gholz supported Paul Kennedy’s thesis 
which noted the maintenance of powerful armed forces depends on the defence 
industrialization process that is upheld by capabilities in technology and the 
manufacturing process (Kennedy, 1989). Even though defence transformation could be 
maintained by arms procurement through the global arms trade, the security-driven 
aspiration for self-sufficiency in arms procurement is a primary reason in building up the 
defence industry (Bitzinger, 2003, p. 11). Additionally, dependency upon foreign resources 
for defence systems could create vulnerability, particularly in times of conflict and war 
(Kennedy, 1989, p. 7). The fear of restraints from arms suppliers incline states towards 
establishing their own defense industries.
Richard Bitzinger described second tier countries as industrialized countries possessing 
small and/or bounded but often quite sophisticated defence industries; developing or newly 
industrialized countries possessing modest military-industrial complexes; and developing 
states with large, broad-based defence industries but still lacking the independent research 
and development (R&D) and industrial capacities to develop and produce highly 
sophisticated conventional arms (Bitzinger, 2009, p. 2). Bitzinger divided the defence 
industry into three tiers. This first tier consists of the critical innovators at the 
technological frontier of arms production and dominant players whose actions will have 
profound impacts on the rest of the global arms industry, for example the United States, 
Britain, France, Germany and Italy as well as Russia (which inherited Soviet Union’s 
defence industries capability) (Bitzinger, 2015, p. 3). The second tier comprises of adapters 
and modifiers of advanced military technologies which also are industrialized countries, 
such as Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, Norway, Japan, China and Sweden. The 
third tier constitutes those newly industrialized countries with limited technological 
capabilities, for instance Egypt, Mexico and Nigeria (Bitzinger, 2009, p. 2).
Second tier defence-industrial-countries also see the defence industry as an instrument 
to drive their economic development and industrialization. These countries pursue parallel 
strategies of ‘security and development’. Second tier states aim to build their heavy 
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industry and technology sector, while, at the same time, they pursue self-sufficiency in 
arms production (Bitzinger, 2003, p. 13). Nationalism, status and prestige also influence 
heavily defence industrialization in those countries. The ability to establish an 
independent defence industry is seen as an indication of great powers status (Bitzinger, 
2003, p. 15). Therefore, acquiring an independent and sophisticated defence industry is 
prestigious for states. 
However, some impediments occur in second tier defence-industrial-countries. Arms 
production in many second-tier states is often inefficient and poorly run, although many of 
them also manage to remain profitable. Arms productions is inefficient and rarely cost-
effective as this form of manufacturing is mainly based on domestic requirements. These 
arms for domestic demand have been characterized as small in number and inefficient in 
production, but high in production cost. Moreover, the industrial management styles tend 
to be rigidly hierarchical, bureaucratic and risk-averse (Bitzinger, 2003, pp. 29-30).
Nevertheless, some second tier countries are able to maintain fruitful defence industries 
despite the abovementioned shortcomings. Why some second tier defence industries are 
able to remain profitable and successful despite those challenges? This paper argues that 
the inclusion of non-arms and dual-use technology sales is crucial to maintain a profitable 
industry, especially when foreign arms sales face heavy confinement. Furthermore, giving 
up autarky and establishing an independent political relations with first tier arms 
manufacturers are imperative to maintain profitable defence industries.
This paper utilizes Japan and Sweden as case studies as these two second tier arms 
producing countries’ experiences show different characteristics and outcomes. The ‘Peace 
Constitution’ and self-imposed arms export ban gave Japan severe restrictions on its 
foreign arms sales. Meanwhile, Sweden did not face such restrictions, though its neutral 
stance during World War II meant the country had limited choices in selling its defence 
products abroad. The two countries defence companies are often listed among top tier 
defence manufacturer countries, especially Japan’s Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and 
Sweden’s Saab. Furthermore, the two countries established defence industries which 
deeply influenced by World War II, both in terms of the circumstances and outcomes. 
Initially, Japan’s ‘Peace Consitution’ limited the country’s industry only for earning foreign 
exchange but could not be used to produce arms. However, the Cold War, and particularly 
the Korean War, subtly shifted these limitations (Samuels, 1994, p. 132). Nonetheless, the 
introduction of Japan’s Policies on the Control of Arms Exports, which ended in 2014, 
prohibited sales to communist bloc countries, states under United Nations sanctions, and 
62 PRIAMARIZKI, Adhi：Assessing the Defence Industries of Second Tier Arms Producers: Japan and Sweden
nations in armed conflict (MOFA, n.d.; Fackler, 2014).
This paper starts by discussing the analytical framework of the methods used to 
maintain the defence industry in the second tier arms producer states. The core argument 
of this study is then assessed against the case of defense industry in Sweden and Japan. 
The paper then concludes with the implication of the findings to the policy making in 
second tier defence industry world.
2. Defence Industry in second Tier Arms Producers
2.1. Second Tier Arms Producers Characteristics
The end of the Cold War put the defence industry world into difficult circumstances. It 
produced a massive decline in global defence spending due to the deteriorating chances of 
conflicts in a global scale taking place. The down turn of the threat from the communist 
countries forced many states to reconsider their high military budgets. Having no 
imminent threat from the communist camp made many countries feel it was unnecessary 
to maintain significant defence budget and large military platforms. From the year 1989 
until 1999, global defence budgets were reduced by nearly 35 percent (Bitzinger, 2009, p. 3).
As the dynamics of global defence spending heavily influenced the defence industry 
sector, the impact of budget cuts in the 1990s was undeniable. Defence budget austerity in 
the 1990s gave a heavy blow to the global defence industry as many of the states with 
leading military capabilities lost their appetite to enhance military power. With a few 
dollars in the market to catch, defence companies adapted a new strategy in order to 
survive this condition. Circumstances compelled these firms to engage in major 
rationalization and consolidation efforts. Further, the quantity of arms producers heavily 
contracted as defence companies either merged or purchased the military assets of the 
other corporations. As a result, mega defence firms emerged in that period.１）
Despite this precarious situation, the end of the Cold War lifted the ideological barrier in 
the arms trade. Defence firms were able to sell their products to the entire world, though 
sanctions and ethical concerns still limit the sales. Consequently, overseas sales are no 
longer a supplemental form of income. Overseas sales become increasingly vital to the 
longevity and stabilization of the defence industrial base (Bitzinger, 2009, p. 5).２） This 
opportunity provided crucial breathing space for the defence industries in the era of 
defence budget austerity. 
All these conditions affected how defence industry operated nowadays. Meanwhile, the 
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developing countries faced the same circumstances as developed countries. However, 
research at SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) in the 1980s showed 
that the arms production capacity in developing countries would be inadequate to permit 
self-sufficiency or create competition for the developed world (Dunne, 2009, p. 30). The defence 
industries in developing countries are mostly made up of adapters and modifiers, or the 
second tier arms producers. Nevertheless, not all of the second tier arms producers are from 
developing countries, and some of them are developed countries (Dunne, 2009, p. 30).
Industrial capabilities and resources become another form of obstacle for the defence 
industry in developing countries. These problems are manifested in program delays, 
escalating costs, technological compromises and the abortive nature of many projects. As 
an effect, achieving sustainability and autonomy in the defence-industry seems difficult for 
developing countries. Despite all of these problems, defence industrialization helps the 
improvement of more advanced military capabilities in some developing states (Boutin, 
2009). Developing countries keep their defence industry because the existence of these 
industries is primarily driven by national security reasons.  These states are afraid of the 
political implications of relying too much on foreign arms producers (Boutin, 2009, p. 229). 
As noted before, the dependency on foreign arms suppliers could provide undesirable 
vulnerability to the developing states military capabilities, especially in times of conflict 
(Bitzinger, 2009, p. 7).
Besides the above-mentioned situation, second tier arms producers also utilize defence 
industry as a drive for economic development and industrialization. Arms production was 
also seen as influencing the development and modernization of other sectors of the 
national industry, such as machine tools and shipbuilding. Likewise, second tiers arms 
producers see the improvement in industrialization and technology capability as a way to 
stimulate the development of domestic arms-manufacturing capabilities, building up 
general skills and know-how, and providing lead-in support or equipment for arms 
production (Bitzinger, 2009, pp. 13-14).
Second tier arms manufacturer countries view their arms production as a way to provide 
other economic benefits as well. They believe the defence industry could function as part of 
import-substitution strategy. The strategy defines that instead of sending capital to 
overseas via arms imports, the developing states can use their own arms production to 
create jobs, balance trade imbalances and protect foreign-currency reserves. Meanwhile, by 
exporting arms, the defence companies in the developing countries play an important part 
in earning foreign-currency revenues (Bitzinger, 2009, pp. 14-15).
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Nationalism, status and prestige play a crucial role in building the defence industry in 
developing countries. For some developing countries that target becoming one of the global 
major powers, the defence industry could help them reach the objective (Bitzinger, 2009, p. 
15). The production from this industry is seen as adding to prestige; for example, the 
production of a sophisticated modern jet fighter could enhance the prestige of the 
manufacturer. One country that has adopted this approach is Indonesia. In the 1990s, 
Indonesia’s airplane company IPTN (Industri Pesawat Terbang Nusantara)３） managed to 
produce the CN-235 which was shown during the country’s 50th Anniversary ceremony, 17 
August 1995. However, the Indonesian government at that time heavily subsidized the 
company as many of its projects were not profitable (Amir, 2007).
2.2. Problems in Second Tier Arms Producers
There are mainly three perennial issues in the second tier arms producers. First, 
problematic relations with first tier arms producers. Most of defence procurements in 
second tier arms producers still depend mainly on foreign suppliers. These countries rely 
on others in several critical fields, such as weapons design, engineering and development 
assistance, critical components and subsystems, as well as machine tools and production 
manuals (Bitzinger, 2009, p. 27). The key to solve these technological problems is held by 
the first tier arm producers. The first tier states apply supply side control to restrict the 
second tier countries’ access to crucial technologies and production equipment (Boutin, 
2009, p. 234). This situation can prevent second tier arms producers to climbing up to the 
next level of technology development and expanding its foreign arms sales.
Moreover, as the capability of the second tier states can undermine the capacity of 
established defence-industrial producers to develop and implement effective arms 
embargoes, technology transfer from the first tier arms manufactures to them unlikely to 
happen (Boutin, 2009, p. 238). Second tier countries’ arms production would give an 
alternative arms procurement opportunity for the embargoed countries. Being potential 
alternative arms dealers leads the second tier defence manufacturers to vast opportunities 
as well as occasionally difficult situations. On the one hand, they can easily seal deals with 
many groups due to their flexibility compared to the first tier arms producer countries. On 
the other hand, the status as an alternative arms dealer puts second tier states in difficult 
situation when making deals with first tier states. The latter will see the former as 
potential competitors rather than partners and as able to undermine their policy vis-a-vis 
arm sales to embargoed countries. 
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Second, the defence industries in second tier countries are rarely cost-effective in 
production and often poorly run. These second tier countries mainly treat their defence 
firms as prestigious industries. Thus, it is commonly found that these companies depend 
heavily upon subsidies and protection from the government (Dunne, 2009, p. 30). Although 
the subsidies and protection have ensured the second tier defence industries survivability, 
this dependency has proven vulnerable. Unexpected economic shocks can easily cause the 
collapse of such companies. The Asian financial crisis in 1997 dealt catastrophic damages to 
many Asian States’ local defence companies, for example Indonesia reallocated most of the 
funding for its strategic industries to other crucial sectors as part of the country’s economic 
recovery plan. Likewise, the global financial crisis in 2008 disturbed the progress of some 
“mega” defence projects, such as F-35, as well as many procurement plans (Europarl, 2011; 
Cervera, 2012). Moreover, overlapping investments and excess competition in the defence 
sector produce over-capacity and poor economic performance in the second tier countries. 
The oligopolistic nature of defence industries and the secrecy of defence procurements can 
easily create corruptions and other scandals (Safitri, 2016, p. 78), particularly if the 
military-industrial complex is serving a particular group’s interests rather than public 
(Hughes, 2009, p. 69).
Third, second tier arms producers’ domestic oriented production is another obstacle for 
them to gain lucrative profit. Arms production in the second tier arms manufacturers 
mostly aims to fulfill domestic requirements, which are usually small in number, inefficient 
in production and high in production costs. As some of these second tier arms producers are 
new players in this market, they are usually having a hard time to compete with well-
established manufacturers largely due to technology gap. This circumstance, especially in 
terms of military innovation and cutting edge modern technology, appeared because of the 
funding availability (Bitzinger, Raska, Koh, & Wong, 2014, p. 202). Nonetheless, the inability 
to compete in international market is not merely due to technical issue, other factors, such 
as political and ethical reasons, also contribute to this difficulty.  
2.3. Foreseeing the Future of second Tier Arms Producers
There are several ways to solve the problems in the second tier countries. Dunne noted 
that producing small arms and relatively unsophisticated weapon systems is a reachable 
objective compared to producing large advance weapon systems in the case of second tier 
states (Dunne, 2009, p. 30) . Thus, Kenneth Boutin suggested limited defence 
industrialization. Boutin suggested that developing countries focus on the production of 
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basic weapon systems (Boutin, 2009, p. 236). By doing this, those countries can utilize the 
limited funding most efficiently and with a larger chance of gaining bigger profit margins 
as no sophisticated R&D required.
Meanwhile, Bitzinger argued for a more comprehensive solution for second tier states’ 
problems. The first solution is, quitting the defence business; a country may choose to 
abandon all defence productions and procure from foreign arms manufacturers. The second 
solution is, rationalizing and consolidating defence operations; a country may continue the 
defence industry by lowering their production for cutting edge defence products and opting 
for less complex products. The third option is diversification; it can be achieved by 
converting some of its arms production capacity to non-military work. The fourth choice 
consists of leveraging dual-use technologies; by adapting dual-use civilian technologies to 
meet military needs. The fifth solution is increasing arms exports; compensating for small 
domestic demand by expanding overseas sales. Finally the last method is globalization; a 
country may choose to maintain its defence industry by expanding its participation in 
international arms production activities (Bitzinger, 2003, p. 40).
This paper does not rejecting all of these arguments. Instead, it adds to those arguments 
by proposing that establishing an independent political relations with first tier states is 
also crucial for the second tier arms producer states to maintain profitable defence 
industries. The second tier countries are potential competitors for the first tier states. 
Therefore, it is possible for the first tier countries to use their political relations with the 
second tier producers as a tool to protect their defence industry. Those first tier countries 
can easily impose political pressure on the second tier states on arms deals to give benefits 
to the former.  In fact, SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), Desmond 
Ball and Boutin argued that arms have become an instrument of influence, especially for 
the hegemonic power (Ball, 1993-94; Boutin, 2009, p. 239). Political dependency on the first 
tier states affects the defence industries of second tier states. To some extent, second tier 
states arms production capabilities would reduce the first tier states’ influence on some 
countries, especially on embargoed states, since the second tier states provide alternative 
arms markets. As a result, the first tier states have the opportunity to exploit the second 
tier states’ political dependency to the first tier states in order to protect the latter defence 
industry. 
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3. Case Study: Japan and Sweden
Both Japanese and Swedish defence firms are often highly ranked among global defence 
manufacturer countries, particularly Japan’s Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Sweden’s 
Saab. Following the end of World War II, the ‘Peace Constitution’ and self-imposed arms 
export ban gave Japan severe restrictions on foreign arms sales. Even though Sweden did 
not experience such constraints, its neutrality during the World War II resulted in limited 
options for foreign arms trading. Unlike Sweden, Japan’s relations with the US often 
created profuse dilemmas and accrued some limitations on the development of Japan’s 
defence industry. Furthermore, a number of corruption cases in Japan reveals an 
inefficient bureaucratic system that potentially undermines the defence industry. 
Meanwhile, Sweden is well known as the most successful second tier arms producer. The 
country adopted the ‘armed neutrality’ concept in running their defence and security policy 
during the Cold War and World War II. Although Sweden and its defence companies have 
been pressured through international arms collaboration efforts to forgo this neutrality 
principle, they have managed to maintain their doctrine and prosper.
3.1. Japan’s Defence Industry: An Immolation of Pacifism
Though Japanese defence companies are often listed in the top rank of global defence 
firms, the country’s defence industries did not escape from the perennial issues of second 
tier arms producers, such as domestic oriented production, political pressure from first tier 
countries and inefficient bureaucracies. This paper identifies three major obstacles for 
Japan’s defence industries, namely anti-militaristic principles and arms export ban (1967-
2014), US-Japan relations, and corruption scandals in the country’s Ministry of Defence. 
The following subsections will discuss these obstacles. Despite those issues, two Japanese 
top defence companies managed to remain profitable, though by relying on non-arms sector 
sales, primarily through dual-use technology products (Taylor, 1993, p. 21).
3.1.1. Anti-Militaristic Principles and Arms Export Ban
In the post-war period, Japanese arms procurement was based primarily on two 
principles: indigenization (kokusan-ka) and anti-militarism (Williams, 2010, p. 78). The 
situation was resulted from the replacement of Japan’s constitution. Defeat in World War II 
forced Japan to include anti-militaristic principles in its constitution. The Japanese first 
constitution was introduced on 11 February 1889, the Meiji Constitution.  This constitution 
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was granted by Emperor Meiji. In the pre-war period, Japan maintained a powerful 
military establishment. Thus, the country was affected by the ‘militarism of the mind’, with 
a body politic officially centered on the Emperor System and nationalistic as well as 
militaristic education (Hughes, 2009, p. 21).
However, this circumstance was compelled to change as the Japanese surrendered to the 
Allies in World War II. In the post-war era, Japan was forced to become a fully 
demilitarized state. The Allied Occupation replaced the Meiji Constitution with the 1947 
Constitution (Watanabe, 1993, p. 36). The framework is written in the Chapter 2, Article 9, 
‘The Renunciation of War’ and reads as follows (Hughes, 2009, p. 22):
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the 
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the 
threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to 
accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well 
as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the 
state will not be recognized.
Japan implemented the self-imposed arms export ban in 1967 a policy which prohibited 
weapon sales to communist bloc nations, states under UN sanction, and countries in armed 
conflict (MOFA, n.d.).  Although the ban initially only forbade to the abovementioned 
categories, it actually evolved into a full-scale arms sales ban, with the exception of 
technology transfers to the US (Pollmann, 2015) The adoption of these principles aimed at 
reinforcing the defensive nature of JSDF which was minimizing its power projection 
capability (Tang, 2013, p. 202). Besides that, this export ban prevented Japan from making 
notable international collaboration efforts regarding defence technology development and 
made the country’s arms industries depend completely on Japanese Defence Agency (JDA) 
orders. 
3.1.2. US-Japan Relations
The United States plays a big role in Japan’s defence industry. Although it has imposed 
restrictions, the United States has also proposed a number of cooperative defence projects 
with Japan. For instance, the relationship between Japan and United States defence firms 
has been institutionalized through the establishment of the USA-Japan Industry Forum 
for Security Co-operation (IFSEC) in 1997 (Williams, 2010, p. 80). A study from Shio Ando in 
2015 showed that between 1975 and 2009, Japan acted as a follower of the United States in 
the context of their defence and security pact when it comes to defence production (Ando, 
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2015).
In its defence relations with the United States, Japan mainly supports Washington by 
supplying facilities, logistic’s supports, and host nation support (Morimoto, 2008). In return 
Japan is promised a secure environment around the country under the United States’ Far 
East regional defence policy (Ando, 2015). During the Cold War era, the United States’ 
nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence become crucial guarantees for regional stability 
in the Asia Pacific which heavily benefited Japan in terms of security. The end of the Cold 
War and the rise of China nonetheless posited new challenges to the relation between 
Tokyo and Washington. 
The United States has maintained its control over the defence industry in Japan since 
the Cold War era. The Pentagon and White House are worried about Japan’s arms industry 
potential future. There will be a possibility that US defence companies will compete with 
the Japanese both in Japan’s domestic market or global market. The case of the Fighter 
Support Experimental (FSX) showed an example of this complicated issue (Lorell, 1996). 
The suspension of US technology transfer was demonstrated in the case of the FSX. 
Although both countries were engaged in this cooperation, the United States was reluctant 
to transfer its technology to Japan, particularly the software (Ikegami-Anderson, 1998, p. 
162). The trade imbalance between the two countries and technology transfers also became 
a serious issue in Japan-US defence industry relations from the 1970s onwards (Edgar & 
Haglund, 1993, p. 155).
3.1.3. Corruption and Reform in the Ministry of Defence
The rise of China and the North Korea nuclear threat have the potential to compromise 
Japan’s security environment. The Japanese government proposed a reform programme of 
the Ministry of Defence (MOD) in order to respond to the new dynamics. Several 
corruption scandals also triggered the reform in Japan’s MOD (Williams, 2010, p. 78).
The corruption scandals involving the MOD were deeply connected to the nature of the 
defence market in Japan. The oligopolistic nature of defence procurement and the pattern 
of politico-bureaucratic-industrial collusion in Japan appeared as the causes of the 
corruption scandals, for example, NEC inflated defence contracts in a scandal in 1998 and 
the MOD suffered a bribery scandal in 2007 which was related to the purchase of five 
General aircraft engines purchase in 2005 (WSJ, 1998; Guardian, 2007; Williams, 2010, p. 
86). 
In addition, Ron Matthews explained that the absence of checks and balances, audits, 
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and specialist procurement personnel within the Japanese Defence Agency (JDA)̶which 
became the MOD in 2007̶permitted the existence of a high-cost environment and 
corruption (Matthews, 2002, p. 47). The decisions for the arms procurement in Japan are 
often derived from the power relations among the actors involved, such as bureaucrats and 
politicians. These influential actors make informal bargains and compromises in the arms 
procurement business (Ikegami-Anderson, 1998, p. 172).
Consequently, the corruption scandals damaged the reputation of the Japanese Ministry 
of Defence and arms manufacturers. Further, these scandals created questions to the 
capability of Ministry of Defence as Japan’s primary national security policy agency. The 
corruption scandals also diminished mounting pressures for a relaxation of arms export 
restrictions (Williams, 2010, p. 89), though the ban was finally lifted in 2014. SIPRI noted 
that costs of corruption in arms procurements are not only financial, but are also 
weakening of the country’s ability to defend itself. Thus, they can undermine the defence 
transformation in that particular country (SIPRI, 2011, p. 26).
3.1.4. The Current State of the Arms Industry in Japan
The implications of article 9 and the arms export ban made Japan’s defence industry 
concentrate primarily on the domestic rather than international market. Furthermore, the 
main revenue of defence firms in Japan is not from the arms trade. For example, Japan’s 
largest arms manufacturer, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI), earned just 9 percent of its 
total income from military sales in 2006. On the contrary, Lockheed Martin and Boeing 
received 90% and 50 % of their earnings from arms respectively (Williams, 2010, p. 80)).
Furthermore, the limited market caused some firms to give up their defence businesses. 
For instance, Nissan Automobiles sold its aerospace business to Ishikawajima-Harima 
Heavy Industries (IHI) in July 2000, and Toyo Communication Equipment sold its defence 
division to NEC in May 2004. Meanwhile, IHI and Sumitomo Heavy Industries released 
their shipbuilding and offshore businesses to create IHI Marine United. The same path 
was also taken by NKK and Hitachi Shipbuilding, when they merged their shipbuilding 
operations with the establishment of Universal Shipbuilding (Williams, 2010, p. 83).
Though some companies had given up their defence businesses, other Japan defence 
firms, such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) and Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI) 
managed to keep their activities profitable. In 2014, MHI gained 1,042 million US$ profit 
while KHI 487 million US$ based on SIPRI database (See Figure 1). MHI’s profit even 
passed France’s Thales which gained 745 million US$ and almost levelled United 
 立命館国際地域研究　第44号　2016年12月 71
Kingdom’s BAE Systems (1,238 million US$). However, MHI’s percentage of arms sales is 
only 10% from its total sales while KHI 15% in 2014 and these numbers are still far behind 
Lockheed Martin (82%), BAE Systems (94%), and even Saab (79%). Based on this fact, 
Japanese defence firms seem not to prioritize defence products compared to other countries’ 
companies. Furthermore, the removal of the arms export ban in 2014 does not guarantee 
significant increasing in terms of foreign arms sales for Japan. Sophisticated products 
alone are insufficient to win the already over-crowded global arms market. Non-economic 
elements often play a larger role in winning arms deals, such as the products being battle-
proven, after-sales support, and political leverage, in which Japan still needs to improve 
(Bitzinger, 2016b). Japan’s 2016 failed submarine deal with Australia is an example how 
these non-economic elements influence arms trade (Gady, 2016; Simpson, 2016).
3.2. Sweden: Breaching into the Elite
Swedish defence firms have always been included in the top ranks of European defence 
Figure 1: Defence Companies Profit 2010-2014 (SIPRI)
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companies, notably Saab. Swedish arm manufacturers are also involved in a number of 
European arms production collaboration, such as Meteor (advance air-to-air missiles), 
Neuron UCAV (unmanned combat systems) and Taurus (Standoff precision-guided 
weapons) (Bitzinger, 2009, p. 183). The country’s defence industries are somewhat free from 
perennial issues that are usually experienced by the second tier defence arms producers. 
Compared to Japan, Sweden has relatively independent political relations with first tier 
arms producers, especially the United States. Sweden also acknowledges that autarky in 
its armaments production is no longer possible (Bitzinger, 2003, p. 33). Sweden has opted to 
integrate its national defence companies into the global arms chain rather than pursuing 
autarky fanatically and depending on domestic sales. 
3.2.1. Swedish Defence Industries before the End of the Cold War
Since the 19th century, and particularly in the Cold War, Sweden adopts an ‘armed 
neutrality’ policy. Swedish government also maintained this policy during World War II. 
This ‘armed neutrality’ protocol in the 1920s made the country unable to import weapons 
for its national defence requirements. In order to solve this problem, Sweden built its own 
defence industry. The Swedish government managed to keep its non-aligned position 
during the Cold War without sacrificing its defence needs (Hagelin, 2010, p. 286).
Moreover, Swedish non-aligned policy demanded self-sufficient capabilities from its 
defence companies. At the beginning of the 20th century, Karlskronavaret (naval surface 
vessels and submarines) and Bofors (artillery systems) were two top Swedish defence 
firms. During World War II, Sweden was cut off from foreign imports due to its neutrality. 
However, Swedish defence manufactures succeeded in overcoming this barrier as its 
defence industries managed to meet domestic requests.
The Swedish government also considered nuclear weapons in order to strengthen its 
military capabilities. Nevertheless, the decision was over-ruled by the Swedish government 
as it believed starting a nuclear weapons programme would make their country vulnerable 
to military attacks from other states. Furthermore, Sweden was afraid that acquiring 
nuclear weapons will undermine their neutral reputation (Arnett, 1998, p. 38).
Nonetheless, in the mid-1970s, Sweden’s high dependence expenditure became a subject 
of domestic debate, since the country at the same time desperately needed a large amount 
of funding for other priorities, particularly education and social needs. Moreover, a United 
Nations’ study in 1981 suggested a positive correlation between disarmament and economic 
development. The Swedish government in the end followed the path to reduce its military 
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expenditure. As a result, domestic military market began to shrink and Sweden’s defence 
firms started their transformation process through mergers and acquisitions (Hagelin, 
2010, p. 287).
Following the decision, Swedish arm manufacturers started to look for other 
opportunities through overseas sales. Nevertheless, it created a great dilemma for the 
Swedish government, since the scope for international military cooperation was limited to 
R & D cooperation with European neutrals and the Nordic countries. Moreover, the end of 
the Cold War presented a more challenging situation for Sweden’s defence industry policy. 
In the post-Cold War era, Sweden implemented a security policy to defend against armed 
attacks of any sort. To achieve this goal, the Swedish armed forces need to be flexible, 
versatile and ‘network-enabled’ (Hagelin, 2010, p. 287). This new warfare concept of network 
centric militaries demanded Swedish arms manufactures to update their technological 
capabilities. 
3.2.2. Swedish Defence Industries after the Cold War
Like any other defence industries, the end of the Cold War had a significant impact on 
Sweden’s arms production. Since the early 1990s, Sweden has been restructuring its arms 
industry. A number of Sweden’s state-owned ordnance, shipbuilding, electronics and 
aerospace companies were merged to form a new firm, Celsius Industries. This new company 
is responsible for half of all armaments production in Sweden (Bitzinger, 2003, p. 34).
Moreover, Swedish arms manufacturers have gone beyond the significant rationalization 
of the 1990s. In the period of 1987 to 1998, workers in the defence-related sector decreased 
from 27,000 to 14,500 workers. Celcius has shrunk by about 25%; Bofors cut 3,500 jobs, or 
almost 60% of the firm’s workforce. Meanwhile, the same conditions applied to Saab and 
Volvo Aero. Saab has decreased by nearly 20%, while Volvo Aero reduced from 1,900 
defence-related jobs in 1993 to 450 by 1998 (Bitzinger, 2003, p. 34).
The restructuring of Sweden’s military industries consists of three characteristics. First, 
local defence companies’ mergers and acquisitions resulted in an increased concentration of 
armaments product ion in fewer defence f i rms. Second, pr ivat izat ion and 
internationalization increased during the 1990s and bilateral industrial cooperation 
increased. Third, industrial aspirations changed from ‘strategic’ to ‘niche-focused’, 
reflecting Sweden’s increased willingness to participate in multilateral collaborative 
projects (Hagelin, 2010, p. 291).
Thus, Swedish defence industries realizes expanding into the overseas arms trade has 
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turned out to be a better strategy for the industry to survive than solely focusing on 
domestic market. Sweden, together with France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United 
Kingdom, signed a Letter of Intent (LoI) in 1999 to merge their aerospace and defence 
firms. The signing aimed at restructuring European defence industry and the development 
of Europe’s Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (Hagelin, 2010, p. 288). Moreover, defence 
firms in Sweden only focus on a few key sectors. For instance, Saab concentrates on 
military aircraft, guided weapons, space technology, and information technologies for 
surveillance, command and control; but left the commercial aircraft business (Bitzinger, 
2003, p. 35).
Through the pursuit of niche competences and greater international collaborations, 
Swedish defence manufacturers retain its military technology ambitions. Nevertheless, 
they understand international cooperation must be ‘combined with measures to safeguard 
our own competence in strategic areas’. Sweden also implement ‘earned workshares’ 
(participation based on demonstrated competencies) rather than juste retour (fair return on 
investment). As a result, Sweden is able to gain technology transfers and ensure their 
defence industries survivability at the same time (Bitzinger, 2003, p. 37).
4. Conclusion: Leveraging Second Tier Arms Producers: 
Lessons from Japan and Sweden
Both Japan and Sweden defence firms have been listed regularly among global top rank 
defence companies and heavily influenced by World War II. Nevertheless, as mentioned 
earlier, Japan defence industries suffered from inefficiency due to the severe restrictions of 
the ‘Peace Constitution’ and self-imposed foreign arms sales ban, corruptions issues, and 
the country’s relations with the US. In agreement with the study from the SIPRI which 
argues that corruption in arms procurement leads to the weakening of a country’s ability to 
defend itself, the inefficiency bureaucracy in Japan that resulted in corruption also has the 
potential to undermine the country’s defence industry capabilities. Furthermore, Japan’s 
relations with the United States occasionally created obstacles. For example, US political 
pressure, despite the high cost of indigenization, forced Japan to adopt a hybrid design of 
F-16 for its home grown Mitsubishi F-2 fighter jet (Bitzinger, 2016a). Despite the 
abovementioned obstacles, two Japan’s largest defence companies managed to keep 
profitable. This circumstance was possible as Japan’s defence manufacturers did not 
depend heavily on the arms sales sector (See Figure 2).
 立命館国際地域研究　第44号　2016年12月 75
Meanwhile, such challenges are relatively absent for Sweden. Although Sweden gave up 
autarky and opened up to the foreign arms supply chain, the country has succeeded in 
safeguarding its own competence areas. Moreover, Sweden managed to restructure its 
defence industry successfully. As a result, Swedish defence companies are efficient in 
producing armaments. The Sweden’s defence industry has the potential to be a stepping 
stone for a successful defence transformation.
Based on the cases of Japan and Sweden, second tier arms producers could apply two 
strategies to remain profitable. First, following Japanese defence companies’ footsteps by 
maintaining large proportion of non-arms and dual-use technology sales. In the case of 
Japan, this strategy has managed to keep Japanese defence firms profitable. Such a 
strategy, however, can make those companies put half-hearted efforts in developing their 
arms sales division as it does not contribute significantly to their total income. Second, 
Figure 2: Percentage of Arms Sales from Total Sales 2010-2014 (SIPRI)
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giving up autarky and establishing independent political relations with first tier arms 
manufacturers could be another strategy to remain effective, as in the case of Sweden. By 
giving up autarky and embracing international collaboration Sweden was able to ensure 
its defence industry’s survivability. Sweden, moreover, has wide room for maneuver within 
arms sales thanks to the absence of significant political dependency. As the arms trade is 
closely associated with politics, first tier defence manufacturers foresee second tier 
producers as being potential obstacles for their political objectives since the latter can be 
alternative providers and Japan and Sweden provide examples of how to be somewhat 
successful in this environment.
Notes
１） For example, Lockheed Corporation and Martin Marietta, both American aerospace companies, 
merged into Lockheed Martin in 1995, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas in 1997, and the fusion of 
UK’s Marconi Electric Systems and British Aerospace into BAE Systems in 1999 (Bitzinger, 2009, 
p. 5).
２） Likewise, J. Paul Dunne noted that future prospects for defence industry are shaped by several 
factors. First, the changing nature of warfare; second, the rate of obsolescence of some major 
weapon systems; third, the new security environment and its demands for new types of military 
missions; fourth, the new technologies introduced as a result of the war on terrorism; fifth the 
degree of outsourcing of services from the military sector (Dunne, 2009, p. 30). 
３） The name of the company has been changed to PT DI (PT Dirgantara Indonesia, Indonesian 
Aerospace Company) since 2000.
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